The Attitudes on the Move
Phenomenological Approach to Interface Culture
par Janez Strehovec
Investigations into the ontological status of the work of art brought phenomenological aesthetics (i.e. movement in aesthetics of 20th century, stimulated with Edmund Husserl phenomenological method) to the realization that the nature of its being is heterogeneous ; for besides real foreground the work of art also contains a layer of unreal background. Analyzing the intentional world of artworks, phenomenological aesthetics likewise revealed such special ontological forms as the unreal and the as-if-real. And, last but not least, phenomenological investigations also raised the issue of the ontological status of pure artificial, in real, given reality impossible entities such as the centaur, the round square, wooden iron etc. The being of these entities - as the so-called impossible objects - is again quite particular in nature ; one could say that their ontological status is shifted from the being towards nothingness. The French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, having dedicated his thought precisely to nothingness - which in a way is essential to the being - reached farthest into these issues. In his Being and Nothingness, Sartre distinguishes intermediate stages between fully positive realities and those whose positive nature is appearance alike, which merely conceals the chasm of nothingness. It is this very notion that first highlighted the existence of reality comprising the non-being within its lines.
Phenomenological approach to the plural-mode being structures pertaining to fictional objects (i.e. objects of art and imagination), however, is not typical only of the theoreticians of phenomenological aesthetics, (e.g. Roman Ingarden, Moritz Geiger, Eugen Fink) ; this field, for example, had been equally familiar also to Edmund Husserl - as testify the writings from his legacy, published in the XXIIIth volume of Husserliana (Collected Works), under the title Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (1980). His major concern here in this book is the fictional objects of imagination (Ger. Fikta) in the sense of as-if-real objects, and the specificity of unreality.
Nowadays ontology can still be written by referring to the tradition extending from Parmenides and Plato through to Husserl and Heidegger. However, this ontological movement can as well be enriched with the analyses of the ontological modality of the new-media entities, such as avatar (visual representation of a participant in a shared virtual community, an interface for the self) and virtual agent. And to these, one could also add investigations into spaces and times that define on-line communications and new-media activities. As a result, the application of the new media generates what we shall term augmented reality as a pluriversum, i.e. reality which encompasses both a given reality plus a vast field of virtual as well as other artificial realities. The components of this reality are objects, which in fact are no more objects full and evident, but rather most fluid and dispersed entities, i.e. often only relations, actions and data arrangement of quite provisional existence. The key issues here are centered around the entities which take place in an instant fashion and last only as long as certain special conditions are being satisfied. The moment this is no longer the case the entities in question go out or can be even erased by pressing a key on the computer keyboard. New digital media, defined both by the classical and second-order cybernetics, thus generate relational forms of existence whose being is likely to be something between the stable being and pure nothingness.
Towards the augmented reality and its ontological plurality
Cyberspace and “cybertime” encompassed within augmented reality therefore don’t overlap with the real space and time. As such they call for comprehensive inquiries as well as noetic and noematic descriptions of virtual entities as such, and in this they have also been addressing the phenomenological approach. What proves crucial here is the fact that phenomenology arises from ontological plurality and has no complexes about entities characterized by fragile and instant nature. This brings us to the following Herbert Spiegelberg’s observation : “What is all-important in phenomenology is that we consider all the data, real or unreal or doubtful, as having equal rights, and investigate them without fear or favor."(Spiegelberg 1960 : 892) Facing the specificity of cyberspatial phenomena, we are now able to discern not only the the as-if real and the unreal, but - metaphorically speaking - also the e-real, the cyber-real, the virtual and the @-real as artificial modes of digital media generated on-line would-be realities. The present-day mediascape increasingly blurs the boundaries between the real and the artificial ; the latter even appears to be the most prominent principle in the techno culture as a main stream culture of so called dot.com societies.
One of the virtues of phenomenology is seen in its ambition to bring description as close as possible to the specificity of the medium in question. On the basis of phenomenological reduction and by considering the plural nature of objects (given as phenomena), it tries to disclose with great accuracy the special nature of the object under analysis, whether real or unreal. Philosopher Eugen Fink, in his investigations into the visual medium, observes that : "objects of the world of images are not objects in the real space, nor do they last in real time ; they exist merely in the space of the world of images and in the time of the world of images.(Fink 1966 : 74,75)" Indeed, this is an instance of taking thinks for granted, typical of phenomenology ; however, such an approach and orientation remain important even in the case of new-media objects, which fall under the concept of the so-called augmented reality. If we think, for example, of avatars and virtual agents presented in cyberspace, we see that in fact they only exist in cyberspace and cybertime, they have cyberpast and cyberfuture, and they can only be the objects and subjects of cyberactions, cyberactivities.
Let us remind ourselves of the theoretician of telematic society Vilem Flusser who pioneered the analyses of specificity in objects established by new media. In his text Conceiving technology (Ger. Technik entwerfen), in the section dealing with the hologram, he remarks that these "pseudo-objects established by means of technology are no more objects of the kind that can be negated by the subject, but rather they are projections, conceived from within the framework of a project". (Flusser 1998:144) In the case of the hologram cube, he approaches the conclusion that this is no longer an object such as to stand in space, but immaterial, pure appearance, pure ’would-being’ (Ger. Sollen). Another example of the phenomenological orientation in dealing with the specificity of a particular medium is also seen in the theory of the work of art as a stratified formation, i.e. formation constructed of several different strata. This theory was developed by Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden, while its bases are found even in Waldemar Conrad’s Aesthetic Object essay. The work of art is thus not a monotonous formation, but has a polyphonic character, founded on the many-layered nature of its structure.
Life in augmented reality fosters the emergence of new forms of perception to fit the interaction with objects in cyberspace. These objects even call for a new sense to be created, namely the sense of the virtual, much in the vein of Karl Marx’s notion of the mineralogical sense and the sense of beauty. This means that our consciousness needs to be cultivated so as to be able to handle the objects which we touch and control in virtual and other realities in a subtle fashion.
Augmented reality is, as a rule, accessible via interfaces, and our contemporary culture apply first of all new media interfaces which generate special matrices, which in turn enable typical, specific access to reality : one interface will run a distinctly particular movie in front of our eyes, while another will confront us with "another story", say, in the form of a computer game.
Furthermore, the use of a particular interface crucially defines the structure and the form of an activity ; by using a word-processor, for example, a text is organized in a different way than it would be organized if it was written with pencil or typewritten. Interfaces also enable us to apprehend space and time in formerly unknown ways and direct us towards new forms of representation. Let us be reminded, for example, of interactive representation (typical of video and of computer games) which takes us from within the perspective of the perfect tense and places us into the imperfect tense referring to the pure present, and from the standpoint of an observer to the position of the protagonist, actor. The game, unlike the story, integrates us into real-time activities, it demands exercise, skill and experience, which means that it most intensely employs all the senses - while creating a new one, i.e. the sense of the game. Games give us directions as to how to achieve mastery in a particular game and how to react quickly in risk situations, but, on the other hand, they only offer a limited and - in comparison to the narrative quality within the medium of the story - an impoverished view of the world, for now this view has been reduced to the mere goals of the game. Games are unmistakably centered around goals and motivated by results - all of which has nothing to do with the story and its subtle use of description.
Ljubljana as a digital cinema
Parallel to augmented reality, therefore, emerges also augmented perception. This means that the perception of the present-day individual is "modeled by media", which is why she looks, listens and touches - metaphorically speaking - in accordance with the principles of film, simulation, clicking and hypertext. Not only film, also new media (1), among which the Internet nowadays occupies an important place, crucially influence perception, activities and imagination of the present-day individual, so that she - metaphorically speaking - sees, hears and touches more and in a different fashion than she would if she didn’t live in the world of interface culture.
In this text I will represent an example of augmented and therefore highly complex perception, enabled by the combination of two interfaces, namely the bicycle and the ride simulator such as can be found in theme parks. Thanks to the very combination of a ride in real space and a ’co-imagined’ ride in a simulator on the one hand and the acquired ’clicking’ sensitivity of a trendy computer culture on the other, I can perceive space in its complex entirety, which means that in the perceived space I can switch smoothly between the spheres of the real and those of the unreal, and enjoy "the essence of the ride as such". This kind of ride is founded in the everyday experience of the author of this paper ; in other words, I am going to write about how I view the city and what I see in it, now that cycling complements both my everyday professional work in front of the computer screen as well as my excursions into the trendy environments of the present-day entertainment industry (simulator races, SF-movies, VR-based games).
I cycle through Ljubljana (Slovenian capital), the city in which I live, in my own way : in the gear which demands rather heavy pushing on the pedals. The latter, offering crude resistance, remind me of the feed back of the force. I myself am uncertain, why I don’t shift gears so as to make it easier for me, why I torture myself in this kind of way and why in fact I am so ridiculous ; for pushing the pedals I keep making unnecessary bows of my head. But that’s how it is : I have simply got used to cycle through the city in my own way. Pushing the pedals of my city-bike brings to my mind mouse clicking, say, in front of a screen featuring some slow 3-D computer animation into which I gradually penetrate by means of clicking. I have already pointed out that I push my bicycle slowly, i.e. so as to feel the maximum of the feed back of the force ; it is for this reason that what I see in front of me does not open up as a traditional movie based on the sensitive chemistry of the film tape. There’s no speed and no play of city lights involved, instead the viewed opens up for me in the sense of step-by-step, even saw-like penetration within the framework of gradual approaching. What is relevant here is in fact sequential approaching, progressing to the rhythm beaten by the metronome and/or some other, digital device.
Riding down Miklošiceva Street or Prešernova Road I not only cycle on them, but at the same time - metaphorically speaking - I also click on them to the rhythm of buildings approaching and receding. Whenever I cycle I take the road as an imaginary zone-tunnel, simulated by my own perception, which ends, say, near the Three Bridges. Thanks to the ’clicking’ pattern of approaching, structured in levels and steps, such a tunnel is shaped as a telescope tube, offering numerous views across the landscape. Slow cycling also allows looking upwards and sideways, at the facades and pedestrians on the pavements flanking the two rows of buildings, and, of course, above all it allows looking down. The cyclist must look down, to the pedals and forward, a little ahead of the handlebar. She must direct an intense gaze also on the surface of the road and on the immediate surrounding terrain, which, however, lies at the same level, i.e. down.
In my imagination, I complement the ride down a real street with a ride through an unreal, ’co-imagined’ tunnel, as of the moment I receive a special stimulus. Viewing the surroundings I notice that acceleration causes the facades to be set in motion as if to create a movie featuring light-dark surfaces with their outlines getting lost. It is in this moment that I switch to the ’tunnel-mode’. Suddenly I notice an agreeable change in the environment under my observation ; this change, caused by my very motion in turn gives rise to a desire/interest that this object-process-movie should last a long time, so that I could, in a way, possess it, and that I could derive some pleasure from its changing. This refers primarily to the changes associated with accelerating and stopping, and, consequently, to the facades alternating between being caught in an interval of a movie and re-entering again into the phase of rigidity, i.e. being re-composed into a stable form. The ’movie experience’ with the liquid architecture of the street, enabled by the interface of the bicycle, but indirectly - in ’co-imagined’ analogy - also by the interfaces of the computer and the simulator, has been provoked by what Roman Ingarden termed "aesthetic original emotion" (Ger. aesthetische Ursprungsemotion)" (Ingarden 1969). By this I intend to denote the stimulus which comes from the environment and manifests itself on a real object as its formal modification. The latter does not inspire indifference, but rather an interest in the particular superstructure that adorns the perception of the real ride through the exploration of an unreal tunnel. This impression, gained in the proximity of attractive qualities which arise from my perception in motion, is in fact only the beginning of the large-scale and complex process of aesthetic experience, which then accompanies my ride. In this experience I combine both modes : a real ride and a ride-process in the world (tunnel) of images. What counts in all this is not only the pleasure derived from the changes which pave way to an ever more intense tunnel-movie (depending on the acceleration) ; what also counts here is the interest in changes resulting from stopping which causes opaque facades on both side of the street to reassemble back into clear architectural outlines.
I do not merely cycle through the city, because in fact I cycle-click through it. This means that I do not merely follow an urban street network, but I also draw my own loops between its threads and nodes : across courtyards, along poorly fenced building sites, through narrow passages. I make use of the bicycle to benefit from the quite special experience of the city’s nearness : to encounter its underlying structures and configurations, to look across the river and into the canals. With my bicycle I stick to those parts of the city where, in a certain sense, the bicycle still belongs, i.e. where it is not thoroughly out of place. The bicycle is not like the scooter, the skate-board, or the roller-skates on which you can speed across the plazzas of huge shopping malls, between skyscrapers and all over wide platforms extending in front of contemporary cinemas which boast 14, 20 or more theatres. The bicycle - to be frank - is actually an old device ; it does not become any place (say, L. A. Downtown, especially if conceived as New Jerusalem handy for any sort of disaster movies), it does not suit anybody, not few find the bicycle downright disturbing. However, the bicycle can still function as an interface, and sustaining a particular framework (moderate speed, moderate detachment from the ground, pushing the pedals, the pedals offering sufficient resistance, the cyclist bending over the handlebar) it enables a quite particular kind of perception. Only the posture and the motion of the cyclist, associated with the pedal pushing-turning intervals, provide for the unique experience of a ’co-imagined’ projection tunnel and the experience of the city’s buildings in it as the scenery of a digital cinema.
What kind of buildings are of interest to us, how do they outline the tunnel ? At this point I must be more accurate : buildings stand sideways, they delimit the outer border. Buildings stand, buildings are there, as a cyclist I actually view whatever fills the area between the buildings and my eyes, and is shaped as a tunnel network. The latter in fact contains not buildings but images-screens softened by motion, and full of light and life, getting stuck on the nodes of the network. These, however, are not momentary stains extended to the degree of formlessness - we are not aboard a high-speed train (like the French TGV) ; the images in the tunnel therefore preserve the configurations of doors, windows, ornamental pillars and the like, which linger for an interval only to extend again at an accelerated pace.
Cycling on roads and paths and sandy trails it is in this way that I watch-in-motion the images within the tunnel network. I perceive this network as a particular spatial configuration, generated by my own activity. This is the space-time-action maintained and modified by my own cycling, it is one space-derivative out of an abundant set. The spatiality of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space that contains the cyclist but builds on notions of being-in-the-ridescape (as a kind of cityscape), full engagement and orientation. It should be stressed here that in in being-in-the-ridescape does not suggest containment ; instead, its use should draw attention to in in involvment, and should thus be associated with being in love etc. Moreover, thanks to its network-sequence structure, not only can I see images and motion, i.e. not do I merely follow/read visualized nouns and verbs, but rather my gaze, enabled by the interface of the resisting pedals, also touches - metaphorically speaking - the conjunctions and prepositions between them. As I cross a section of the cityscape, I cycle into and, I watch to, over, towards, in the direction of, from the direction of. Furthermore, I cycle between and into, for, in a sense, I also dive. The space-time-action of cycling and/as clicking falls primarily under the domain of verbs, conjunctions and prepositions.
Is the virtual space of the tunnel constructed according to the perception of a cyclist the only feasible form by which imagination can enhance cycling through the city ? Does the augmented gaze emerge only via the configuration of the tunnel ? Can pedaling-as-clicking also be seen from a different perspective ? It can be. There are areas where the city exposes its bowels, or at least its wounds, i.e. where it falls apart and where it is being built. Upon such areas I also cast - metaphorically speaking - the blanket of the satellite orbital gaze. What do I mean by that ? In this case, the whole thing looks like as follows : I cycle and at the same time, by virtue of my perspective modified with the optics of a satellite camera, I am - above. Cycling (say, around building sites, amid ruins) I look down as if from a spacecraft slowly cruising over an unknown planet, stopping-clicking each time I push on the pedal, to catch a close-up image of some striking configuration on the planet’s surface, say, a crater. My cycling-clicking corresponds to a point-by-point crossing of space. And, it seems that the cycling also brings something “more” (e.g. aura) to the city wounds.
This description is intended as an illustration of how a means of transport as traditional as the bicycle enables a quite particular kind of perception, as of the moment we start using it as an interface in order to experience environment in a special way. Also the issue of (new) media in general is the issue of technologically modeled and accelerated perception, i.e. perception which is enabled via a particular matrix, or, better, enframing (Heidegger’s term), and which - in the case of the bicycle - is fairly specific. It differs distinctly from perception pertaining to, say, the now fashionable, re-actualized scooter. The defining feature of the latter - reiterating the mouse metaphor - is ’clicking by pushing against the ground in a vibrating ride into the image, which makes one the protagonist of quite specific pushing, and, subsequently, also the advantage of a long, economic use of the impetus in a fading ride without major intervals.
It is typical of state-of-the-art interfaces that they are increasingly departing from separate, isolated functioning ; on the contrary, they are being linked up and enhanced to form systems. Perception enabled by a particular interface, too, is intertwined, linked, combined with perception enabled by another interface. The city as a digital cinema in cyclists’ experience -as the key topic of this text, is cycled-through and constructed-viewed through both interfaces, namely the bicycle and the screen and/or their units, i.e. the pedals and the mouse. My cycling into the city as a digital cinema is also based on the experience of perception which had been shaped in front of the computer screen. Without any clicking, watching SF movies with special effects and those employing IMAX technology, and without racing in simulated rides, I would view things differently while I cycle, and I would see - in a certain sense - less ; the cityscape would be poorer by that tunnel derivative of space which is shaped exactly by my ride and which exists in the time of this same ride.
Liquid switching between various modes of perception
The issue which needs to be raised at the close of this text concerning the description of my cycling through the city is how to place this sort of perception within phenomenological investigations. Could it be that my exploration of the city in the form of cycling-clicking refers primarily to the mode of perception within the main stream interface culture - the mode which is foreign to the perception of situations which preoccupied Husserl and his successors ? Does Husserl at all provides us with a phenomenological approach to the issues of this kind ?
My answer to the latter question is affirmative. Not only the texts gathered in the XXIIIth volume of Husserliana, also his analyses of space and time (say, temporal structures of kinaestetic sequences in the Ding und Raum) and perception remain of reasonable value as guidelines in such descriptions. Switching to the as-if mode and, consequently, the particular derealization of objects and processes, had been described also by Husserl himself ; or better, they had been described in the form which calls for modifications, such modifications as I myself proposed describing a ride through an unreal tunnel. Husserl claims : "Reality can be observed as if it were an ‘image’." And, further : “In a way, any thing can be viewed as an ‘image’. (Husserl 1980 : 591, 593)" In the context of phenomenology, seeing something as-if it were an image paves way to the procedure of derealization, and consequently to the as-if mode - which finally means that the given real becomes infected by the ‘as-if mode’. Viewing the world as if it were an image, as Husserl explains in his Ideas, requires a neutrality-modification of consciousness, that means, in the image we intend to a reality within the mode of "quasi". Husserl is of great importance to this text also with his fundamental standpoint, namely that every thing (and therefore not only a thing of artistic imagination) can be observed as an image, which means that every thing can be included among the objects of derealization.
If I now return to the description of what I perceive cycling through my home city, I can note once again that I perceive the streets within some real attitude, and at the same time I also see them as an image. Not only, however, as a static image in Husserl’s sense, but rather as an movement-image (G. Deleuze’s term), i.e. as in film. And, in a certain sense, not even only in that way, but also as a theme park simulator’s screen.
The contemporary individual, confronted with the mediascapes of interface culture, is clearly urged on to observe this reality’s components and processes as-if they were images, movies, simulator rides or computer games. Perceiving augmented reality, she is urged on to switch to the ‘as-if’ mode.
The question that is raised at this point concerns the nature of this switching, as in the changing of attitudes, when the user of the reality mode, that is characteristic for actions in everyday life, switches to as-if world mode (environment in which she is included). We have already mentioned Ingarden’s notion on aesthetic original emotion as a starting point for a process of aesthetic experiencing that leads to reality in mode quasi. And such a process, the change of attitude, in the context of Ingarden’s phenomenology is understood as something very demanding and sophisticated, and about which he wrote in The Cognition of Literary Work of Art : “The appearance of the original emotion in a person’s stream of consciousness produces, above all, a certain check in the preceding "normal" course of experiences and modes of behavior in regard to the objects surrounding him in the real world.(Ingarden 1973 : 191,192) But since the break of the practical orientation with this check is very demanding in that it leads us far away from the conditions in which we normally are, in the same way the return to the normal conditions is demanding as well. Ingarden described this in the following way : »The return to the concerns of earlier life is often accompanied by discomfort, by a feeling of the pressing weight of life, from which the original aesthetic emotion had, to a certain extent, freed us.« (ibid.,193) Therefore Ingarden’s concluding thought about the nature of such switching is not surprising : »The transition from the practical to the aesthetic attitude is perhaps the most thoroughgoing change in man’s psychological attitude.« (ibid.1,96)
At first glance these Ingarden’s notions can be perceived as extremely historical. They are bound to the time before the (new media based) interface culture became part of the mainstream, when only rare situations, connected to art environments (coming across works of art), made the switching off from everyday reality possible based on contact with the original aesthetic emotion. On the contrary, the readiness to work in different generations of reality, different worlds and different times belongs to the present status of a trendy individual. Switching among them requires orientation towards very particular conscious acts, but it flows fluently, without extra difficulty for the psychological life of the fe/male individual. It looks as if her horizon of expectations (it is Hans Robert Jauss’ term from his aesthetics of reception) got used to the demands of participating in ontologically differently founded realities, therefore the demands of entering the synthetic spaces and times don’t cause extra problems to an individual. We are actually witnesses of a learned, routine readiness for such switching, for the contemporary fe/male individual spends more and more time in the as-if mode. It looks like Husserl’s idea of the as-if mode infecting reality is being realized in the interface culture as well.
But is the change of attitudes, that nowadays obviously doesn’t cause major problems, something that completely coincides with the transition from the natural attitude to the aesthetic attitude, that would mean a specific profanation of phenomenological reduction ? Does the cyclist on the streets of Ljubljana that got our attention in this text, really function as some kind of "virtual phenomenologist" ? Is the modern environment of mediatization and virtualization, cleaned of sharp edges of natural reality, a kind of a “realm” of pure phenomena that follow the radical interruption with natural attitude that is bound to practical goals ?
The answers to these questions are negative. Nevertheless, we have to be aware of differences between trendy mediatization on one hand and derealization and neutralization in the context of phenomenology on the other. This trendy mediatization is not a “pure” derealization at all but is based on mixed experiences (Ger. Gemischte Erlebnisse) about which also Husserl wrote a lot about in the texts, collected in the XXIIIth volume of his Collected Works. The phenomenological device of changing attitudes is productive also in the research of specificity of media based attitudes. However, the reality of the media is not the reality of the accurately carried out phenomenological reduction, but is the mediatized reality as a synthetic hyperreality - let’s say in the context of Jean Baudrillard’s theory. And it is characteristic for this new generation that often tries to be more real than the given reality and this especially passes for the virtual reality (2), that is simulated in the context of a reality, accelerated with artificial handling and as convincing as possible. Here we have a very typical example of the new interactive media that is formed polemically opposed to the big traditional media such as the press, radio, film and television, with the promise that by using their devices (example real/web camera, logged on the Internet) they will get closer to reality as-we-know-it in a more authentic way than the traditional media. The upgrade of the cyclist ride in the co-imagined tunnel described in this essay was also stimulated by the wish to upgrade the ride in the given reality with the ride in a more complex form of simulated reality. The latter demanded the bracketing of the given reality, but this bracketing referred to the mode of this reality, to its “given” or natural and not to the characteristics of the positing something real.
At the end we could say that the reality of phenomenology is one thing, the reality of the (new) media is something else. However, the phenomenological approach is the one that allows us to make crucial questions, when it comes to the new media as well. In the case of life in the augmented reality these questions are also connected with the investigations of attitude. In this essay we have seen that the plural mode of the forms of the real within the augmented reality corresponds with the plural mode of perception and the latter requires the habituation of contemporary individuals to different attitudes and fluid switching between them. They need to customize the vertiginous experience of living in-between different realities.
1. New media includes the Internet, special effects, virtual reality, hypertext, digital animated poetry, DVD, web sites, computer multimedia, CD-ROMs, computer games, digital music (in MP3 file format), etc.
2. Virtual is not identical with the aesthetic mode of reality, it does not take a place within as-if mode, meaning that its chief concern is also a practical one like as in natural attitude. Virtual has a complex of the real, it even tends to be more real than given real itself, and also the activities which take place within cyberspace are often directed to a very practical aims. The stress in VR applications is often laid right on their striking real effects, VR is actually the reality upgraded to tits most sophisticated high-tech form. Being active within VR does not presume taking their components within as-if mode.Virtual presumed just a neutralization of the crude material features of the reality by replacing them with the data, i.e. digital features ; on the other hand, the practical attitude is being preserved also in artificial realities. On the contrary, aestetic attitude means something quite different, and it could be applied also for the entities in cyberspace.
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© Janez Strehovec / Organdi 2000-2007